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(2) whether the law's definition of "high-water mark" was vague. First,
the court stated Madison's claim intended to challenge the
legislature's failure to enact a law, not to challenge vagueness. Second,
the court held Madison failed to show the definition of high-water
mark was so vague that men of common intelligence had to guess at its
meaning. Accordingly, the court affirmed FWP's fourth motion to
dismiss.
FWP's fifth motion to dismiss concerned whether the claim
violated the statute of limitations. The court found Madison missed
the three-year general tort statute of limitations deadline by
approximately twelve years. The court rejected Madison's claim that a
Thus, the statute of
continuing violation exception applied.
limitations barred Madison's claim.
FWP's sixth motion to dismiss asserted res judicata barred
Madison's claims. Because one of the Madison's co-parties was
previously involved in a suit challenging the same law under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the court decided res judicata barred
Madison from raising the same claim on the same grounds.
FWP's motion to dismiss argued the Full Faith and Credit Clause
required that the court honor a previous adjudication of the
constitutionality of Montana's Stream Access Law, therefore, barring
Madison's claims. The court found that two of the Madison co-parties
received virtual representation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
through participation in an earlier adjudication. Thus, the court held
resjudicata barred Madison's claim based on the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
FWP's final motion to dismiss concerned whether the RookerFeldman Doctrine ("Doctrine") barred federal district court review of
Montana Supreme Court cases. Under the Doctrine, a federal district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review final state supreme
court decisions or constitutional claims intertwined with state court
decisions. The court held the Doctrine barred Madison from seeking
federal appellate review in this federal district court and granted the
motion to dismiss.
The court sustained all of FWP's motions to dismiss and dismissed
Madison's complaint with prejudice.
ChristineEllison
D'Agnillo v. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., No. 89 Civ. 5609
(CSH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17290 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000)
(holding alleged deficiencies in the City of Yonkers' environmental
assessments for a housing development were not sufficient to: (1)
grant an injunction to withhold United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development funds for the development; (2) grant an
injunction to stop construction by the City of Yonkers; (3) declare the
environmental assessments invalid; or (4) declare the City of Yonkers
must conduct another area-wide environmental assessment).
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In the fall of 1999, the City of Yonkers ("City") had three sitespecific environmental assessments ("Site-Specific EAs") and one areawide environmental assessment ("Area-Wide EA") prepared for its new
housing development sites. The United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") required such Environmental
Assessments ("EAs") in order for the City to receive federal funding.
All four EAs resulted in findings of no significant impact ("FONSIs").
The City published the results in March 2000, along with notices of the
City's request for HUD funds.
John D'Agnillo objected to the four EAs and their FONSIs. The
City responded to his objections in June 2000, finding them
nonmeritorious. D'Agnillo filed a motion with the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, asking the court
to: (1) enjoin HUD from dispersing funds for the three sites; (2)
enjoin the City from beginning construction on those sites; (3) declare
that the EAs and FONSIs violated the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA") and HUD regulations; and (4) declare the City must
conduct another Area-Wide EA before beginning construction. To
support these requests, D'Agnillo alleged that: (1) the City failed to
make the EAs publicly available; (2) the Area-Wide EA was incomplete
because, given its date relative to the three Site-Specific EAs, the AreaWide EA did not incorporate their findings; (3) the Area-Wide EA was
incomplete because it failed to mention the location of parkland
donated to the City; and (4) the Area-Wide EA did not properly
evaluate the cumulative effects of a site containing wetlands.
First, the court found the EAs were publicly available to D'Agnillo.
Although D'Agnillo was allegedly unable to obtain copies of some of
the EAs at the local library, the City mailed copies to him at his
request. The court felt that by mailing the EAs to D'Agnillo, the City
had attempted in good faith to comply with NEPA's public availability
requirements. Moreover, the court found that even if the City had
failed to comply with these requirements, such failure did not warrant
the injunctive and declaratory relief D'Agnillo requested.
Second, the court found the Area-Wide EA was complete because
its publication date pre-dated those of the three Site-Specific EAs.
Although the Area-Wide EA, which included the findings of the three
Site-Specific EAs, pre-dated them, the court felt this conflict did not
have the meaning ascribed by D'Agnillo. In particular, the court
found the three Site-Specific EAs were available in draft form when the
Area-Wide EA was being prepared. In addition, all four EAs went
through simultaneous revisions until they were finalized. The court
concluded these findings indicated the Area-Wide EA took the results
of the three Site-Specific EAs into account. Moreover, D'Agnillo had
not alleged any specific shortcomings in the Area-Wide EA to indicate
it was incomplete and, therefore, the court should invalidate it.
Third, the court found the Area-Wide EA was not incomplete for
failing to mention the location of parkland donated to the City.
According to the court, the purpose of the Area-Wide EA was to
discover what detrimental effects the housing project would have on
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the environment. The court reasoned that adding parkland to the
area would have only a benign effect on the environment and,
therefore, a failure to specify its location could not undercut the
conclusion of the Area-Wide EA. Moreover, D'Agnillo failed to
explain why the location of the parkland had to be included in the
Area-Wide EA.
Fourth, the court found that even though the original Area-Wide
EA failed to evaluate impacts on wetlands located in one of its site
areas, such failure did not warrant another area-wide EA. The court
found the City did not issue a FONSI for this site because of the
presence of wetlands. Instead, the City had commissioned a more
comprehensive environmental impact statement ("EIS") to evaluate
any impacts to the wetlands. Although the Area-Wide EA contained a
statement indicating no wetlands would be affected by the
development project, this factual inaccuracy was due to prior court
orders on the scope of the Area-Wide EA. In order to correct this
inaccuracy, the court indicated the Area-Wide EA would have to be
updated. However, the court felt that because the wetlands area was a
self-contained environmental matter, failing to discuss it in the AreaWide EA was not grounds for its invalidation, a new area-wide EA, or
an injunction to prevent construction by the City.
Fifth, the court found D'Agnillo had no basis to seek to enjoin
HUD from dispersing funds to the City. According to the court, HUD
could withhold funds only if it rejected a potential recipient's
environmental findings on limited procedural grounds spelled out in
its regulations. The court found the deficiencies alleged by D'Agnillo
in the EAs did not fall within these HUD regulations.
For the reasons stated, the district court denied D'Agnillo's
motion.
Matthew j Costinett
N.W. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Blue Heron Paper Co., No. 00-1201-KI, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17848 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2000) (holding: (1)
environmental group's activities created sufficient constitutional
standing to bring suit against a paper mill under the Clean Water Act
based on allegations that the mill harmed fish populations in the
Willamette River; and (2) Oregon Revised Statute section
468.025(1) (b) regulating discharge of wastes into state waters created
no private cause of action to enforce the statute, but damages could be
sought by pleading the claim as a common-law tort).
Blue Heron Paper Co. ("BHPC") operated a recycling mill that
discharged high-temperature wastewater into the Willamette River.
Northwestern Environmental Defense Center ("NEDC") sued BHPC
under both the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and Oregon statutes. NEDC
alleged high-temperature water release adversely affected fish in the
river and the rights of NEDC members who fished those waters.

